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Introduction  
The three books discussed here can all be classified as memoirs or even as 
auto-ethnographies. The two authors relate how they experienced the recent armed 
conflict in Iraq. The narratives of both authors include detailed accounts of the 
extraordinary efforts they made to help Iraqi friends leave the country. Although 
Ashcroft and Johnson view the war from two very different perspectives, their 
narratives complement each other and can be read together profitably. Researchers 
and scholars with a focus on contemporary armed conflict should nevertheless find 
them well worth reading. This review explains why. 
Ashcroft’s books  
Making a killing: The explosive story of a hired gun in Iraq is James 
Ashcroft’s first book and Escape from Baghdad, his second. Ashcroft employs a 
narrative style typically associated with 
entertainment as purpose and the general 
public as target audience. He wrote both books 
with the aid of a ghost writer, Clifford 
Thurlow. 
188 
 
In his first book, Ashcroft focuses on his tour of duty in Iraq with a UK-
based private military security company (PMSC) called Spartan, from 2003 to 2005. 
Spartan had won a contract to train a guard force of 1 500 Iraqis for the protection of 
water supply infrastructure. Ashcroft was a member of the team of former British 
Army soldiers1 employed as trainers. 
Ashcroft’s second book is a sequel to the first. It is a personal account of his 
participation in an attempt to rescue a former Spartan comrade and his family from 
Baghdad in 2007. The former comrade, Assam (‘Sammy’) Mashoen, is an Iraqi 
national who had been employed by Spartan as chief translator for the guard-force 
training programme. Sammy’s name had been entered in a Shia death list and he 
was actively being hunted at the time.2  
Kirk Johnson’s book  
To be a friend is fatal: The fight to save the Iraqis America left behind is 
Kirk Johnson’s first book. It is a personal narrative told in non-chronological order. 
Part of the book deals with Johnson’s experiences as an employee of the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Iraq during 2005. Most of 
the book, however, is devoted to Johnson’s experiences after an accident had ended 
his USAID career and forced his return to the United States. In this part, Johnson 
describes his efforts to obtain visas for US-affiliated Iraqi nationals. Johnson’s book 
also contains a few first-person accounts by some of the visa applicants. 
Johnson’s narrative is informative, interesting and sometimes even 
entertaining. Readers will quickly realise, however, that the intended audience is the 
American public, and that Johnson wanted to achieve something more than merely 
entertain them. He clearly wrote the book in order to champion the cause referred to 
in the subtitle – saving the Iraqis America left behind.3  
Academic utility of Ashcroft and Johnson’s narratives 
At least two major reasons may be given for regarding the narratives of 
Ashcroft and Johnson as useful to researchers and scholars with an interest in 
contemporary armed conflict. The first is the research value of personal narratives in 
general. It is a perfectly valid modus operandi for literature-based research to gather 
information about armed conflict by reading the personal accounts of participants 
and eyewitnesses. Ashcroft and Johnson’s books can be treated as primary sources 
of information, since the authors wrote mostly about events that they themselves had 
experienced. Note also that it is possible to regard the narratives of Ashcroft and 
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Johnson as examples of auto-ethnography – if one views them from a qualitative 
research perspective.  
Access to the perspectives and the observations of Ashcroft and Johnson is 
the second major reason why scholars might find their narratives useful. Both 
authors comment on a number of issues of interest to researchers and scholars with a 
focus on contemporary armed conflict. Each author enjoyed the benefits of a 
particular vantage point that qualify him as an authoritative observer and which 
informed his narrative. Both authors, amongst other things, were able to access 
information and exploit observation opportunities unavailable to those in other 
positions.  
Ashcroft’s perspective 
Ashcroft’s vantage point can be characterised as that of someone:  
 Who had been an infantry officer in the British Army;  
 Who experienced the Iraq war as an employee of Spartan, a PMSC based 
in the UK;  
 Whose job required close contact and cooperation with both Iraqi 
nationals and American soldiers; and 
 Who re-visited Iraq in order to help rescue an Iraqi national who was a 
friend and former Spartan comrade.  
Ashcroft’s military career started in 1992 when he attended the Royal 
Military Academy Sandhurst. A year later he joined the 1st Battalion, Duke of 
Wellington’s Regiment as an infantry platoon commander with the rank of captain. 
Ashcroft’s assignments and tours of duty during the next six years included Bosnia 
and Northern Ireland, as well as working with US Airborne, US Marines and US 
Special Forces. Ashcroft resigned his commission in order to return to his original 
career as a law practitioner, but soon regretted his decision and started daydreaming 
about re-joining the British Army. Spartan made him an employment offer a month 
after the invasion of Iraq (19 March 2003). Ashcroft accepted immediately and 
never regretted his new career choice,4 the significance of which should not be 
underestimated. Ashcroft had already been daydreaming about quitting his job and 
re-joining his old battalion when the private military industry offered him an 
alternative military career. This option had not been available to previous 
generations of soldiers. Furthermore, Ashcroft was offered the job precisely because 
he had served in the British Army. 
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 Regarding Ashcroft’s experiences in Iraq war as an employee of Spartan, 
one should keep in mind that PMSCs played a role of unprecedented significance in 
the Iraq war. According to scholars such as PW Singer and David Isenberg, the US 
forces could not have operated without private military support. Singer believes the 
Iraq war to have been a defining moment for the private military industry.5  
The most obvious implication of point three is that Ashcroft, in his close 
contact and cooperation with both Iraqi nationals and American soldiers, had access 
to the views of not only the Americans with whom he came into contact, but also to 
the views of his Iraqi comrades and acquaintances. His circle of friends included 
both American soldiers and Iraqi nationals.  
The rescue of an Iraqi national, a friend and former Spartan comrade, is 
significant for a number of reasons. It was a team effort by people who risked their 
lives voluntarily and without any remuneration. This constitutes behaviour 
irreconcilable with the traditional image of mercenaries. The rescue team included 
not only former Spartan colleagues of the Iraqi translator, but also the American 
colonel who employed Sammy at that stage and who actually initiated the rescue 
attempt. The reader may ask him/herself why the colonel did not use official 
channels to save the life of his translator.  
The most significant issues commented on by Ashcroft include:  
 Private military security companies in Iraq; 
 The US military in Iraq; 
 The Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq;  
 An Iraqi perspective on the war and its consequences; and 
 The Shia–Sunni conflict. 
A comprehensive discussion of these issues lies beyond the scope of this 
review article. Instead, brief mention will be made to some of Ashcroft’s more 
revealing comments.  
Ashcroft on private military security companies in Iraq 
It is worth noting how Ashcroft characterises his job at Spartan. He and his 
comrades were contracted to work as PSDs (personal security details).6 Ashcroft 
describes the work of a PSD as follows, “As PSDs, we don’t get paid to kill people. 
We get paid to protect people, protect the water supply, bodyguard journalists and 
aid workers, keep our heads down and keep our clients out of trouble.”7 
What is most significant about this job description is that which is left out. 
PSDs were not contracted to actively prosecute the war and were not deployed in an 
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offensive role. They were employed in a defensive role only – to train people, to 
protect installations and to bodyguard important individuals. One should keep in 
mind that every building and every important person guarded by PMSCs was one 
less for the US Army to protect.  
Also noteworthy are Ashcroft’s many references to the professionalism and 
military experience of typical PSDs. The founders of Spartan were ex-military 
themselves. Ashcroft describes Spartan as “[…] a UK-based outfit set up by a group 
of ex-officers, one of a clutch of new security firms with savvy bosses aware that the 
United States didn’t have enough boots on the ground”.8 At another point in his 
narrative, Ashcroft writes,  
This is what we were being paid for: for the experience and the 
training we had in dealing with counter-insurgency and guerrilla 
tactics. It was good to know that I would be (a) doing work I was 
good at and (b) working with people who were just as good.9 
Ashcroft himself had been recruited by a Spartan employee who knew of his 
professional military background. When he joined Spartan in 2003 there was a large 
pool of ex-soldiers who did short-term contract work for a relatively small group of 
companies and many personnel recommendations were based on word of mouth. 
Successful job seekers not only had to be well-trained and experienced operators, 
but good team workers as well. At a later stage during the conflict, however, the 
demand for security personnel increased to the point where some companies were 
“[…] hiring men by the yard, barely even scanning CVs before offering contracts”.10  
In Ashcroft’s opinion, most PSDs conducted themselves in a professional 
and disciplined manner, but a minority did not: “There are on the Circuit some 
trigger-happy adventurers who shoot and scoot with little provocation, Rambo 
lookalikes in head-bands with bandoliers of cartridges. Sometimes you come across 
some cold-blooded killers. But these men are in the minority.”11 Escape from 
Baghdad contains a description of the unprofessional conduct of an American 
civilian contractor team who had been hired to escort a convoy and who had proved 
to be completely ineffective during an ambush. Before the convoy started, team 
members had given the impression that they had had little or no combat experience 
and were more concerned with their appearance than anything else.12 One even 
turned up for the departure of the convoy at 03:00 wearing sunglasses.13  
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Ashcroft on the US military in Iraq 
Ashcroft’s perspective on the US military and their behaviour is 
illuminating. His impression of the US military changed greatly during his tour in 
Iraq. Ashcroft arrived in the country with the idea that the US forces were “trigger-
happy thugs”.14 This impression was based exclusively on media coverage of the 
war. As a Spartan employee, however, he worked closely with US troops and 
therefore could base his impression on direct observation. He eventually concluded 
that (i) only a small minority of the US troops acted like “trigger-happy thugs” and 
(ii) that the majority of the US troops were “professional, dedicated and sympathetic 
soldiers doing a tough job under extremely difficult circumstances”.15  
In his first book, Ashcroft describes two incidents that illustrate the type of 
behaviour by US troops that alienated the local population. The first incident was an 
encounter by Spartan PSDs with an American vehicular patrol that was following 
the standard operating procedures in effect at the time. The second incident was an 
insurgent attack on the checkpoint at a Green Zone gate where a line of vehicles 
(including those of Spartan) was waiting to be let through. The response of the US 
guardian force not only demonstrated how the local population was being alienated, 
but also why ‘friendly’ fire from the US contingent of the Coalition Forces took out 
most of the contractors killed at that time (2003).16 Ashcroft nevertheless concluded 
that: 
It would be too simplistic to blame insensitive Coalition troops for 
fanning the flames of the insurgency. […] As far as I could see as a 
former infantry officer, the occupation troops had from the start been 
dealt an awful hand to play by their superiors.17  
Also illuminating is Ashcroft’s account of a “vigorous discussion”18 he had 
with some US officers.19 During that discussion, Ashcroft made himself unpopular 
by pointing out (i) that most of the US military knew very little about the various 
insurgent groups and what they were fighting for; (ii) that it is difficult to prevent an 
enemy from achieving its objectives if you do not know what they are; (iii) that the 
American soldiers with whom he came into contact, disagreed amongst themselves 
about what the US military was trying to achieve in Iraq; and (iv) that serious 
deficiencies qualified all the answers he had received from American soldiers about 
US objectives in Iraq. It is worth quoting Ashcroft’s response when asked whether 
he himself could give a satisfactory answer to the question:  
‘I don’t know, mate,’ I replied cheerfully. ‘What I do know is that I 
should be able to go out there and ask any soldier what he or she’s 
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fighting for and they should know why they are here. But they don’t. 
[…] And I’m sat here with a bunch of senior officers and they can’t 
tell me why there are American soldiers dying out there everyday. 
And that, gentlemen, is not right.’ 20 
Ashcroft on Iraqi perspectives 
Ashcroft’s inclusion in his narrative of the views of some Iraqi 
acquaintances increases the book’s value to researchers and scholars. Ashcroft 
enjoyed certain advantages when it came to eliciting and understanding the views of 
his Iraqi associates. As a trainer, he worked closely with Iraqi interpreters and 
trainees. Furthermore, the Spartan training team was not quartered in a military base 
(like most of the soldiers) or in the Green Zone (the cordoned-off compound 
housing the Coalition Provisional Authority and its civilian, non-Iraqi work force). 
The training team was housed in an abandoned bus depot in the Aradisha Idah 
neighbourhood of Baghdad, where they came into daily contact with their Iraqi 
neighbours and even employed some of them. Ashcroft’s relationship with some of 
his Iraqi co-workers and neighbours developed to the point where he could 
successfully elicit their opinions. These opinions constitute some of the most 
illuminating and disturbing parts of Ashcroft’s narrative, as illustrated by the 
following quotes.  
Ashcroft describes how his Iraqi acquaintances viewed the war as follows:  
I was not divorced or isolated from daily life in Baghdad. I was 
living and working with Iraqis, working class and middle class, from 
the illiterate to the well educated, and it was depressing listening to 
their daily tales of loss and fear. None of them, from the highest to 
the lowest, paid any attention to the international propaganda about 
the ‘Coalition of the Willing’. It was clear to them all that this was a 
primarily American and partly British occupation. Christian armies 
were in power in their country and harsh and unforgiving treatment 
of civilians by Coalition soldiers at checkpoints only brought back 
memories of the Ba’athist regime.21 
Ashcroft found the following view of the USA surprising:  
Chatting with Sammy and Colonel Faisal over beers through many 
long evenings brought out a surprising view of the United States 
from the Iraqi perspective. Although many Iraqis saw the chaos 
around them as evidence of American incompetence, many former 
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military officers, including Sammy and Faisal, dismissed that 
argument. They thought America was unarguably the most powerful 
country in the world. […] It was inconceivable that such a powerful 
country could let Iraq crumble into medieval anarchy with hundreds 
of thousands of people living with no utilities, fuel, food or medical 
aid. […] To them it was a deliberate plan, orchestrated to punish the 
Iraqi people. They had no doubt of that, and just wanted to know 
how much they needed to be punished before this time would end.22  
The following view that Ashcroft recorded can be considered alarming 
rather than merely surprising:  
No one had liked Saddam because he was a murderous tyrant. […] 
By mid-2004, when everyone was heartily sick of the blood and 
dying, Colonel Faisal confided to me that if Saddam were released 
and put back in charge, most Iraqis would welcome him.23  
Upon seeing this passage, the reader may be tempted to ask 
him/herself whether a worse condemnation of the US-led intervention is 
possible.  
Johnson’s perspective on the Iraq war 
Kirk Johnson’s vantage point can be characterised as that of someone:  
 Who served as an information and public affairs officer in the Baghdad 
office of USAID;  
 Who served in the field as a USAID regional coordinator for 
reconstruction in Fallujah;  
 Who spoke Arabic fluently; and 
 Who engaged in a campaign to obtain visas for US-affiliated Iraqi 
nationals and eventually founded the List Project to Resettle Iraqi Allies.  
One implication of the first two points in the list above is that Johnson had 
an insider’s view of both the USAID bureaucracy and the reconstruction effort. 
Especially significant are the reasons why Johnson became disillusioned with both 
posts.  
One of Johnson’s primary responsibilities as a public affairs officer was to 
find good news about USAID reconstruction projects and to summarise it in a two-
page report called the ‘Iraq Daily Update’ (IDU). The distribution list of the IDU 
included a large number of bureaucrats, journalists, contractors and US Congress 
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members. Johnson became disillusioned with his job as producer of the IDU when 
he realised that he “[…] was the person in charge of turning out little scraps of 
propaganda with tenuous ties to reality”.24  
A contributing factor to Johnson’s disillusionment was that the language of 
the IDU was the language of the US government – “USGspeak”.25 USGspeak, 
according to Johnson, is a coded language that offers bureaucrats an escape route in 
case something goes wrong, as well as a trail of bread crumbs in case something 
goes right and they want to take credit. Johnson’s account of USGspeak, including 
his Glossary of USGspeak, is both informative and entertaining.26 At this point in 
Johnson’s narrative, the reader might wonder about the quality of the information 
that eventually reached planners and decision-makers back in the USA. 
Johnson mentions that he embarked on his Fallujah assignment with the 
hope of contributing something tangible to the reconstruction effort in Iraq, but that 
he was worried about the meaning of the term ‘coordinator’ in his new job title – 
regional coordinator for reconstruction in Fallujah. Producing the IDU had shown 
Johnson how potentially toothless the verb ‘to coordinate’ could be in USGspeak.27  
Johnson also mentions that USAID had already allocated roughly $15 
million for various reconstruction projects in Fallujah before he went there. As a 
result of the insurgency, however, nobody from the agency had ever been sent to 
check up on the work. Instead, the USAID mission in Baghdad had relied on one- or 
two-paged reports emailed periodically by the main contractors involved. Johnson 
decided to start with a small audit of the projects listed as completed. In view of the 
circumstances, it is not surprising that he found that “There was waste or fraud in 
nearly every project I looked at.”28 One of the examples that Johnson gives in this 
regard involved a fictitious rubble removal project into which millions of dollars had 
already been poured. Johnson realised that he could request project termination only 
if he had a worthy replacement ready. The reason why Johnson could not 
immediately request the termination of the rubble project is illuminating: 
I wanted to end the program, to stop wasting the money. This would 
require crying foul, informing the USAID cognizant technical 
officers and management back in the Green Zone that their projects, 
which earned them a lot of favor with the Pentagon and were part of 
the whole hand-in-glove craze, were bullshit. And if a project didn’t 
exist, it meant that auditors in the Inspector General’s Office might 
catch on and start poking around in other parts of their work.29  
After his accident and return to America, Johnson learned that USAID had 
never sent a replacement to Fallujah, that the worthy alternative project (irrigation 
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canal clearing) had unravelled and that the project funds had been diverted back to 
rubble removal. His interpretation of the news is, “Despite all of my efforts, not a 
single thing remained. It was as if I had never even been there.”30 The reader may 
wonder whether the problems that Johnson encountered in Fallujah were the 
exception or the rule. Widespread waste and fraud would indicate that reconstruction 
failures in Iraq were due to more than just the insurgency.  
Johnson’s command of Arabic is the third point in the list at the beginning of 
this section. When he arrived in Baghdad, Johnson was the only American in the 
USAID office who could speak Arabic fluently. Johnson’s narrative clearly shows 
that his command of Arabic decisively affected his perspective on the war in Iraq. It 
also played a major role in the divergence of his views from those of his fellow 
Americans in the Baghdad offices of USAID. Johnson’s command of Arabic and his 
attitude towards his Iraqi colleagues stood in sharp contrast to those of his fellow 
Americans in the USAID office. During Johnson’s welcome briefing, for example, 
the supervisor of the 90 Iraqi employees in the office remarked, “Oh, their names are 
so tricky and hard to remember! Just call them Ahmed or Mohammad, that’s what I 
do, and it sure seems to do the trick.”31  
Johnson does not delve into the reasons for the attitudes that many of his 
fellow Americans displayed towards their Iraqi colleagues. He merely mentions 
increasing distrust as the insurgency progressed.32 The reader may ask him/herself 
whether the attitude towards Iraqi employees as described by Johnson was common 
in the Department of State bureaucracy in the USA as well. The reader may also 
wonder whether this attitude had anything to do with the lack of cooperation that 
Johnson encountered when he tried to arrange visas for American-affiliated Iraqis.  
Johnson’s campaign to obtain visas for US-affiliated Iraqi nationals is the 
fourth point in the list at the beginning of this section. His account of this campaign 
constitutes about half the book. Johnson explains, amongst other things, how and 
why he embarked on his campaign. He also describes the visa applicants whom he 
tried to help. They all had at least three things in common: 
 They were people whose lives were being threatened by local militias 
because they had been identified as Iraqis working for the Americans;  
 Their American employers in Iraq refused to help; and 
 Their applications for American visas were being stalled by the 
Department of State bureaucracy.  
Johnson’s account of his visa campaign contains a number of interesting and 
significant points. The first and most important point is that Johnson, despite all his 
efforts, failed to change the obstructionist behaviour of the Department of State 
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bureaucracy. This was despite the impressive political support that he managed to 
mobilise. Johnson, for instance, managed to obtain support from Senator Edward 
(‘Ted’) Kennedy.33 Late in 2007, Kennedy led a bipartisan coalition of senators in 
passing the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act. This act made provision for the granting of 
25 000 immigration visas specifically to US-affiliated Iraqis over a period of five 
years. Near the end of that period (in 2013), about 18 000 of these visas had not 
been issued.34 It should further be noted that the bureaucracy maintained their stance 
despite the replacement of the Bush administration with that of Obama.  
Another reason for regarding Johnson’s account as interesting and 
informative is that he found historical precedents for the stalling of visa applications 
by US-affiliated foreign nationals. Something similar happened at the end of both 
the Second World War and the Vietnam War.35 
Johnson’s remarks about USGspeak constitute a further reason for regarding 
his account as interesting and informative. The account contains many examples of 
USGspeak by Department of State bureaucrats. Readers should find it interesting to 
compare what was said (or implied) at the time with what was actually happening.36 
Readers might even be tempted to take it one step further and compare the 
relationship between ‘truth’ and ‘USG speak’ to the relationship between ‘truth’ and 
‘Newspeak’, as used by George Orwell in his novel Nineteen eighty-four, first 
published in 1949. 
In conclusion, the books should be useful to researchers and scholars with an 
interest in contemporary armed conflict. The value of the books lies in the 
perspectives of the authors. 
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